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Introduction
Our understanding of dividend policy depends on the behavior of individual investors, from the early work of Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Gordon (1961) to the more recent behavioral finance theories. Many empirical papers have documented corporate dividend policy and payments, and have related the policies in various ways to the theories based on the behavior of individual investors. While there appears to be a general agreement that investors like dividends, there has been no systematic study on why individual investors want dividends. We fill that gap by asking individual investors about their attitude towards dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that individuals can undo management's decisions on dividend policy in a perfect and complete capital market by either reinvesting dividends or selling off stock, making dividend policy irrelevant. In the United States until recently, as well as in most other countries, dividends have been taxed more heavily than capital gains. The irrelevance theorem in combination with the unfavorable taxation of dividends makes dividends a puzzle. Brealey and Myers (2003) consider the dividend controversy to be one of the "10 unsolved problems in finance". Fama and French (2001) find that the proportion of U.S. firms paying cash dividends has fallen from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999.
1 Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. 2 These findings might be a response to the dividend puzzle. However, recently dividends have gained renewed attention. On May 23, 2003, the U.S. Congress passed a "tax relief" bill that includes a major change in taxation of investments. 3 Capital gains and dividends will now be taxed equally at a top rate of 15%, eliminating the tax penalty on dividends. During the period after the bill was proposed and before it passed, Microsoft announced that it would start 2 paying dividends for the first time in its 28-year history. Technology companies such as Cisco and Oracle stated that if dividend taxes were eliminated, they would start paying dividends. This has led to a renewed interest in the question why investors want dividends.
Since the seminal paper of Miller and Modigliani (1961) , the literature on dividend policy has been strongly dominated by economic modeling approaches, both in developing hypotheses and in empirical investigations of dividend policy. 4 Brennan (1970) provides an after-tax model of dividend valuation and the Capital Asset Pricing
Model that other researchers use. Notably, Black and Scholes (1974) find no evidence of a dividend effect and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) find a significant effect.
Many other papers grapple with this conflict and related hypotheses, but the field of finance has not yet reached a consensus on the effect of dividend policy on firm value.
Even though many papers appear later than Black (1976) , his belief is still the current
opinion (page 5): "Why do corporations pay dividends? Why do investors pay attention to dividends?... I claim that the answers to these questions are not obvious at all. The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don't fit together".
To shed more light on the dividend puzzle, we surveyed a unique Dutch panel of ordinary families who answer questions on personal finance and consumption matters weekly via an organized website/e-mail link. Since this voluntary panel is accustomed to completing questionnaires and most of the panel members will respond, many of the difficulties of survey research are avoided. Furthermore, a demographic profile of the panel members is available, which allows us to better understand the survey responses and test the dividend theories more fully. To the extent that the characteristics of Western investors are similar, we expect our results to be relevant for other Western countries.
We do not include institutional investors in our survey. We are testing the theories developed over more than 40 years relating to individual investor decisions. If institutional investors are acting in place of their clients, then their portfolio decisions will reflect the preferences of their clients. This is particularly true for managers of investment funds, since the income flows directly to the beneficial owners. Our survey looks at individual investors who hold shares directly and/or through investment funds.
The indirect holdings through pension plans are not represented.
Conducting research in the Netherlands on dividend preferences has a special advantage, because the new Dutch tax system does not tax dividends and capital gains differently, while the old (pre-2001) system taxed dividends more heavily than capital gains. This tax environment provides us with an excellent setting to test dividend theories by isolating the tax effect on dividends from other considerations. In this regard our results should be more informative than past U.S. survey results, and also provide a preview of investor preferences in the U.S. under the new tax law.
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In some previous studies, including Lintner (1956) , Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985) , Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002) , and De Jong, Van Dijk, and Veld (2003) researchers used questionnaires to find out why companies pay dividends. A particularly interesting paper in this vein is Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2003) , who have surveyed 384 CFOs and treasurers of mostly U.S. companies, and conducted 23 in-depth interviews with executives on their payout policy. They find that financial executives believe that retail investors have a strong preference for dividends, despite the tax disadvantage. Another interesting finding is that financial executives believe that dividends convey management's confidence about the future. However, managers say that they do not pay dividends as a costly signal to convey their firm's true value.
Therefore Brav et al. (2003) conclude that they only find modest support for the signaling hypotheses. Their survey finds little support for the agency theories of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) .
The aim of our paper is to determine what individual investors believe about dividend policy. This question is also examined by Brav et al. (2003) , but they do so indirectly by asking financial managers for the view of the investors. The managers in their questionnaire believe that individual investors want dividends, but the reasons are not clear. Therefore Brav et al. (2003, page 19) Our results unambiguously indicate that individual investors are not indifferent to dividends. The mean score on the question whether they want dividends was answered with an average score of 4.98 on a scale that ranges from 1 (= I do not want dividends) to 7 (= I want dividends), with 4 being the neutral score. 60.5% of the respondents indicate a score of 5 or above, while only 12.3% answer 3 or below. Both the mean and the median score on this question are significantly different from 4 at the 1% level. There is a strong confirmation of the signaling role of dividends. Our results are inconsistent with both the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) , and the agency theory of Easterbrook (1984) . All these results are remarkably consistent with the results of Brav et al. (2003) .
The results further indicate that transaction costs are an important reason for individuals to like dividends. Investors appear to view dividends as a cost-efficient way of realizing capital gains or losses. These results are stronger for relatively old, low income and less-educated investors. The uncertainty resolution theory of Gordon (1961 Gordon ( , 1962 is not confirmed. Investors seem to consider dividend-paying stocks to be more risky than non-dividend paying stocks. Overall, investors do not believe that dividendpaying firms are less likely to manipulate earnings, although the notion that dividends work as a guarantee of earnings quality finds some support among older investors.
As one of our most striking results, we find that investors consume significantly less from dividend income than from regular income. Therefore, the behavioral finance theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) is not confirmed for cash dividends. On the other hand, this theory is confirmed for stock dividends. In case companies cannot pay out a cash 5 dividend, investors prefer the companies to "pay" a stock dividend, rather than no dividends at all, even though in principle stock dividends are no more than stock splits.
Finally, we find that, apart from older and low-income investors, individual investors do not tend to consume a large part of their dividends. Rather, they re-invest their dividend income. This raises some doubt as to the effectiveness of the reduction or elimination of taxation on dividends as a means to stimulate the economy.
The remainder of this paper is built up as follows. Sections 2 and 3 summarize the theories and hypotheses in the literature on cash and stock dividends respectively. Section 4 describes the research method and data collection. Section 5 describes survey results and discusses how they relate to our hypotheses. Section 6 concludes.
Theories on Why Investors Want Cash Dividends
a. The Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance theory
In their seminal paper Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect and complete capital market the dividend policy of a firm does not affect its value. The underlying idea is that the stockholder can replicate any desired stream of payments by purchasing and selling equity. This theory also shows that in perfect and complete capital markets, investors are indifferent towards receiving dividends. This question only matters to them if financial markets are imperfect or incomplete.
b. Transaction costs
A rational argument in favor of dividends consists of transaction costs. An investor who wants to receive a regular income from her security holdings has a choice between buying dividend-paying stocks and cashing in the dividends, and buying non-dividend paying stocks and regularly selling part of her portfolio. For a small individual investor the transaction costs of cashing in the dividends may be significantly smaller than the transaction costs associated with selling a part of the stocks (see e.g. Allen and Michaely (2002) ). c. Uncertainty resolution Gordon (1961 Gordon ( , 1962 argues that outside shareholders prefer a high dividend policy.
They prefer a dividend today to a highly uncertain capital gain from a questionable future investment. 6 A number of studies demonstrate that this model fails if it is posited in a complete and perfect market with investors who behave according to notions of rational behavior (see e.g. Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Bhattacharya (1979) ). Nonetheless, the original reasoning of Gordon (1961 Gordon ( , 1962 Shefrin and Statman (1984) refer to this as the behavioral life cycle.
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At first this theory shows some resemblance with Gordon's (1961 Gordon's ( , 1962 theory.
However, the theory of Gordon is based on uncertainty towards future dividends, while the theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) is based on investors who prefer to consume from dividends instead of capital gains.
f. Free cash flow
Free cash flow is the cash flow that remains after all positive net present value (NPV) projects are undertaken. According to the overinvestment theory of Jensen (1986), managers aim to expand the size of the firm, and thus may take on negative NPV projects instead of paying dividends. Managers consider a large firm to be more prestigious and they expect to earn more compensation than they would in a small firm. This is obviously not in the interest of the existing shareholders. Black (1976) 
g. Agency costs
Even if a firm does not have free cash flow, dividend payments can still be useful for the shareholders in order to control the overinvestment problem. Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends reduce the overinvestment problem because the payment of dividends increases the frequency with which firms have to go to equity markets in order to raise additional capital. In the process of attracting new equity, firms subject themselves to the monitoring and disciplining of these markets. 11 This lowers agency costs. A share repurchase creates the same monitoring effect.
Corporate governance operates somewhat differently in the Netherlands than in the Anglo-Saxon systems. Dutch companies with over 100 employees and over 11.4 million Euros in shareholders' equity must use a "structured regime" of governance, and this includes almost all of the companies that are listed or that Dutch investment funds could invest in. The shareholders initially establish a supervisory board and a management board. The supervisory board appoints the management board and must approve its actions, including the annual financial statements. The supervisory board also has the right to determine its own membership in the future without reference to the shareholders.
The shareholders have no vote on how the supervisory board changes its membership over time, nor do they have any vote on management actions. The shareholders do vote on mergers and acquisitions, and dividend policy. The supervisory board can introduce various forms of dual class equity that make hostile takeovers almost impossible, again without shareholder vote. Large Dutch multinationals with more than 50% of their 9 employees outside the Netherlands may opt out of these provisions, but typically they have chosen to follow them.
The supervisory board and the management board work closely together normally.
These governance mechanisms therefore tend to entrench management, whether the shares are widely-held or not. De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2003) provide more discussion of this system and its effects on share value. For our study, the implication is that if dividend policy is an effective means of reducing the agency costs of management-ownership separation, then dividends should be particularly important for Dutch shareholders, since they have very little other power to exercise over management.
h. Signaling Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) argue that information asymmetries between firms and outside shareholders may induce a signaling role for dividends. They show that dividend payments communicate private information in a fully revealing manner. The most important element in their theory is that firms have to pay out funds regularly. Therefore, a similar reasoning applies to recurrent share buy-backs.
i. The choice between cash dividends and share buy-backs
Common stock repurchase is a well-known alternative to cash dividends. Both ways of paying out cash are useful to mitigate the agency problems that are raised by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) .
A large number of academic papers find that share buy-backs are especially useful to signal that the stock price of the company that buys back its shares is undervalued. A number of studies, including Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Vermaelen (1995, 2000) find that share buy-back announcements are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. Vermaelen (1995, 2000) have also analyzed the long-run performance of US and Canadian companies after share buy-backs. In these studies a significantly positive long-run positive abnormal 10 returns is found. These results confirm the undervaluation hypothesis for share buybacks.
j. Taxes
The subject of dividend policy has received a lot of attention in the United States. The reason for this is that in the U. received during the year. In the old tax system prevailing before January 1, 2001, dividends were treated as ordinary income and were taxed at a progressive rate. In the old system, capital gains were not taxed at all.
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There is a withholding tax (dividendbelasting) of 25% on dividends. This withholding tax was levied both in the current and in the old tax system, and would be refunded if the taxpayer completed a tax return.
The taxation of investment funds deserves special attention. Both in the current and in the previous tax system, investment funds can apply for the status of investment institution (beleggingsinstelling). If this status is granted the investment fund pays no corporate tax. However, it also has the obligation to pay out its profits within eight 11 months after the end of the book year. Given the equal treatment of dividends and capital gains in the current system, it has become increasingly beneficial for Dutch investment funds to apply for this status. This also means that investment funds are more likely to pay dividends than ordinary exchange-listed companies.
Theories on Why Investors Want Stock Dividends
k. Stock dividends as small stock splits
An issue that is closely related to that of cash dividends is the question of why some companies "pay" stock dividends. As every standard textbook in Finance teaches us, stock dividends are nothing more than a small stock split. DeBondt and Thaler (1995) refer to stock dividends as one of the big anomalies in finance.
l. Transaction costs
Stock dividends may have an advantage over cash dividends because they may carry lower transaction costs. This is the case if the ultimate goal of the investor is to re-invest the dividends. With a stock dividend, the dividend is effectively re-invested in the same stock. With a cash dividend, transaction costs are incurred to re-invest the money in stocks. Again, it has to be noticed that a stock dividend is not a real dividend. However, for an investor who sees a stock dividend as a real dividend, and who wants to re-invest her money, stock dividends may reduce transaction costs. It also has to be noticed that with a cash dividend, an investor can choose to invest her money in another stock. This is not the case with a stock dividend. Finally, a stock dividend may carry a disadvantage if the investor owns an odd number of shares. For example, an investor holding 113 shares might receive one share for 100 stock dividends. This would mean that she either has to sell 13 stock dividends or that she would have to buy 87 stock dividends. This might make a stock dividend relatively expensive for a small investor.
m. Taxes
In the old Dutch tax system, stock dividends were not taxed if they were paid out of the additional paid-up reserve (agioreserve). It should be noted that the fact that stock dividends were tax-free under the old tax system did not carry as big of an advantage as seems at first. Stock dividends are nothing more than a stock split and should not be taxed in the first place. In the new tax system, the tax indifference that applies to cash dividends also applies to stock dividends.
n. Behavioral finance Shefrin and Statman (1984) argue that there are behavioral reasons to "pay" stock dividends. These reasons are especially compelling if the company does not want to pay a cash dividend, e.g. because it does not have free cash flow. They argue that stock dividends are labeled as dividends. Therefore, an investor who sells off and subsequently consumes her stock dividend does not break the rule to not consume out of capital.
Furthermore, stock dividends that are kept in portfolio are considered differently from the original stocks. The reason for this is that many investors think in terms of gains and losses. They consider the price for which they acquired the share of common stock. This price is different for the original share and for the share that was acquired with the stock dividend.
Empirical Methods and the Data
Survey Methods and CentER Panel
We conducted a survey amongst individual investors to test the theories discussed in the previous two sections. Survey-based research is becoming more common in finance.
Surveys complement research based on large samples and clinical studies, particularly on a question like dividend policy where the beliefs of investors are the basis for most of the theoretical models. Graham and Harvey (2001) argue that large-sample studies often have weaknesses related to variable specification and the inability to ask qualitative questions.
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Results of clinical studies on the other hand are often sample-specific. Survey-based research offers a balance between these two approaches. Graham and Harvey (2001) also recognize a few problems associated with survey-based research. The first is that the respondents may not be representative of the population. The second is that survey questions may be misunderstood. The third potential problem is that surveys measure beliefs and not necessarily actions.
Dividend policy is one of the few areas in finance where survey research has been used fairly frequently. Examples include Lintner (1956), Baker et al. (1985) and Brav et al. (2003) . However, all these studies have focused on managers of companies that do or do not pay dividends. As far as we know there is not a single study that has asked individual investors about dividends.
The survey used in this paper consists of a questionnaire submitted to the panel of 
The Questionnaire
We have made large efforts to avoid the potential problems that are associated with the use of surveys. First, the problem that the respondents may not be representative of the population is avoided by the use of the CentER panel. Second, we ask several questions for each of the theories in order to limit the possibility that our questions are misunderstood. Finally, while it is true that surveys measure beliefs rather than actions, we do not view this as a problem, since beliefs are what we want to measure.
The use of this panel has great advantages over the more usual survey/questionnaire research. The professional experience of CentER staff provides assurance that the mechanical aspects of questionnaire distribution, confidentiality and data collection run smoothly. The final form of the questionnaire is largely standardized so that the respondents do not have to accustom themselves to new formats for each separate research project. The respondents are accustomed to answering questions from CentERdata and thus the error rate should be low. Although panel members are not obliged to fill in all the questionnaires, the response rate is guaranteed to be very high.
Furthermore it is possible to link the results to demographic factors (such as education, income and age). Besides that, the identity of respondents is kept confidential. Clients cannot get any identifying information, and the respondents know this, which makes them more likely to answer truthfully. Finally, it is possible to test for non-response bias more effectively than is possible with ordinary surveys.
We did not conduct personal interviews, as Brav et al. (2003) did. The confidential nature of the respondent database precludes us interviewing any of them. Since the questions we are asking are directed to specific hypotheses about dividend preferences, we were not looking for the open-ended, less circumscribed evidence that personal interviews are better at capturing. If we had wanted to determine some new theory of why investors want dividends, we might have considered grounded theory.
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We developed the questions to be as easy to answer as possible, to make the responses useful.
The English language version of the survey instrument is included in the Appendix.
We originally created the questionnaire in English as it appears here, but the version sent to the respondents was translated into Dutch.
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While there is a substantial literature on survey and questionnaire design, most of the difficult issues do not arise in our work. There is no politically or socially desirable answer to bias respondents. The only challenge is to design the questions in such a way that captures the essence of the hypotheses that were put forward in Sections 2 and 3.
Therefore the questions have to be couched in plain, unambiguous language that the respondents understand. For this reason, the questions were designed in cooperation with the researchers from CentERdata who administer the panel and who have a lot of experience with conducting this type of research.
Questions 1-4 determine whether the respondents own, or have owned within the last three years, shares in companies and/or investment funds. If they have not, we exclude them from the rest of the survey. Questions 5-26 investigate the various hypotheses and theories about cash dividends we advanced in the previous section. Question 27 asks a question unique to the Dutch tax system. Questions 28-32 ask questions related to stock dividends.
Statistical Inference
These responses are both presented for the whole sample and for sub-samples according to demographic statistics, i.e., age, income and education. Most of the questions are asked on a scale of 1 to 7, with 4 as the neutral score. Respondents could also answer 8 for "Don't know/No opinion" and these responses are omitted from the statistics.
For Questions 5-32, we test whether the mean and median responses are significantly different from the neutral response, and whether the responses from demographic groups are significantly different. Based on the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, we cannot reject the null the researcher creates one or more hypotheses about behavior that she can test on larger numbers of subjects or sites. For example, this is essentially the method that Lintner (1956) uses. Since we are testing established theories in the field, we go directly to the larger sample. 17 The Dutch version of the questionnaire is, on request, available from the authors.
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hypothesis that the response rankings are normally distributed at the 0.01-level, for all questions. However, we still use a non-parametric two-sample test for the median responses.
For most questions with a neutral score of 4, we test whether the mean response is different from 4 using t-statistics. We test whether the median is different from 4 by taking the difference between the response and 4, and assessing whether the median difference is different from 0 using a two-tail Fisher sign test, with statistical significance reflected in the binomial p-value. We use a two-sample t-test to test whether the mean responses are different between demographic groups. The corresponding differences in medians are assessed using a non-parametric two-sample median test.
For Question 27, which asks for a binomial response (=1 if "yes", 0 if "no"), we test whether the response is different from 0.5 using a t-test for the mean, and a sign test for the median. For the difference in mean between demographic groups, we use a Z-test for the difference in proportions. The difference in median between groups is still assessed using a two-sample median test.
Results
Overview of Survey Respondents
The questionnaire based on the theories discussed in Sections 2 and 3 was presented to the 2,723 members of the panel of CentERdata on the weekend of October 4, 2002.
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These members had the opportunity to fill out the questionnaire from 17.00 hours on Friday October 4, 2002 to 24.00 hours on Tuesday October 8. In total 2,035 respondents filled out the questionnaire (74.7%). This makes the number of non-respondents equal to 688. Out of the 2,035 respondents, 555 panel members own or used to own shares in exchange-listed companies and/or investment funds. Table 1 gives the summary demographic statistics of the survey respondents.
[Please insert Table 1 here] Figure 1 gives the demographic distributions of the survey respondents.
[Please insert Figure 1 here]
It can be concluded from Figure 1 that on average investors are older, have higher income and are better educated than non-investors, which is what we would expect. Table 2 includes the responses to the questions on cash dividends.
Results for Cash Dividends
[Please insert Table 2 is reduced from 555 to 507. However, our conclusions remain unchanged, although there are occasional minor changes in statistical levels. These results are available on request from the authors. 19 From now on a low income is defined as a monthly gross income lower than 3,000 Euro. A high income is from now on defined as a monthly gross income higher than 3,000 Euro. 20 We have also looked at the modes for each group. Most of the time the mode and the median are identical. Even when they are different, the mode responses between groups are almost always the same. Therefore we have not reported the modes in the text.
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The first question in Table 2 (Question 7) asks whether investors like their stocks to pay dividends, with possible answers from 1 for "I do not want dividends" to 7 for "I want dividends". A score equal to 4 means that the investor is neutral between receiving dividends or not. Both the whole sample and all the sub-samples show means and medians significantly greater than 4. The mean for the whole sample is 4.98 with a tvalue of 14.04. The median is 5 with a binomial p of 0.0000. The percentage above the neutral score of 4 (60.5%) is much larger than the percentage below the neutral score of 4 (12.3%). This justifies the conclusion that investors want dividends. In other words, investors do not believe in the irrelevance theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1961) .
The preference for dividends is larger amongst investors with an age above 55
(hereafter, the "older investors"), compared to investors with an age below 55 (the "younger investors"). However, both categories show highly significant means and medians. Both the result that retail investors want dividends and the result that this is especially true for older investors are in line with the survey results of Brav et al. (2003) .
They find that some CFOs state that some of their investors are the "gray-haired set" or "mom and pop" investors.
The second theory tested in this table is whether investors want dividends for reasons of transaction costs. The mean score for this question is 4.20 with a t-statistic of 2.79.
Only 20.5% of the respondents indicate a score lower than 4, while 33.3% of the respondents indicate a score higher than 4. The median is 4 and is significantly different from the neutral score of 4, on a significance level of 0.0002. At first sight it looks strange that a median score of 4 is significantly different from the neutral score of 4. This can be explained by the large difference in percentages of observations above or below 4.
Despite the fact that the mean and median score of the whole sample are significantly different from the neutral scores, there are remarkable differences between the different demographic groups. Old investors, low-income investors, and investors without university education all have a preference for dividends because of transaction costs. On the other hand, young investors and investors with a high income and/or university education have less interest in dividends based on transaction costs. For each of these three groups the difference in means is significant. For the income and education categories the difference in the median scores is also significantly different from zero.
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The third theory is the uncertainty resolution theory that was originally suggested by Gordon (1961 Gordon ( , 1962 . According to this theory investors prefer dividend-paying stocks, because they are perceived to be less risky. The result for Question 9 for the whole sample suggests the opposite result. Investors perceive dividend paying stocks to be more risky: the mean score is 4.13 with a t-value of 2.37. Questions 10 and 11 also confirm this result. Apparently, investors perceive high dividend yield stocks to be more risky than low dividend yield stocks. This result may be explained by the level of the stock index in the research period. In the period from July 2002 to October 2002 the index of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the AEX-index, dropped to a level below 300 points. This was the lowest level in 7 years. At the same time most of the companies in the index maintained their old dividend levels. As a consequence, the dividend yield rose strongly, especially for badly performing stocks. This may have contributed to the perception that high dividend yield stocks are riskier. Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002) surveyed managers of NASDAQ companies that consistently pay cash dividends. They also find that there is no evidence in favor of the uncertainty resolution theory.
The theory that dividends are a safeguard against accounting manipulations is rejected in Question 13. In Question 12 the mean of 3.92 and the median of 4 for the whole sample are insignificant. Both questions show the interesting result that older investors more strongly believe in this notion than younger investors do. The results suggest that the watch for dividends as a safeguard measure is still "old-fashioned", even in light of the recent accounting scandals.
An anonymous referee suggested that these responses might differ if the nationality of the investments is considered -investors would be more wary of relying on financial statements from a country with somewhat weaker accounting and auditing standards. In response to this idea, we were able to return to the panel with a second, short questionnaire, and determine for a small subset whether or not they held 10% or more of the portfolio in US stocks, thereby implicitly treating the US as having different standards from other countries. We do not find a significant difference between these two groups in their responses to Questions 12 and 13. Our results are also inconsistent with the agency theory of Easterbrook (1984) . Both
Question 19 and Question 20 show very low means and medians. For example, the median score for both questions is never above 2. Moreover, these means and medians are strongly significant. This result holds for all demographic sub-samples. These results suggest that individual investors have a preference for management to use internal funds to finance capital budgeting projects, in line with the pecking order theory of Myers and paper, since it is difficult for individual investors to ascertain whether managers deliberately use dividend policy to signal the true value of the firm.
There is a seeming inconsistency between the belief that dividend-paying stocks are riskier than non-dividend paying stocks on one hand, and the belief that dividends are a good signal of the profitability of the firm on the other hand. However, it is worth noting here that it is the change in dividend payments, not the level of dividends that signals future cash flow prospects. In this regard, our result that investors believe that dividendpaying stocks are riskier than non-dividend paying stocks (from Questions 9 and 10) is not inconsistent with the signaling result. Investors can view a firm to be of high risk if it is paying high dividends; on the other hand, if that firm increases dividend payments, this is viewed as a positive signal for its future profitability. Similarly, the finding that many investors don't feel more certain about the earnings prospects of dividend-paying firms (from Question 12) is not necessarily at odds with the signaling effects of dividends either. One interpretation is that investors think that a high current dividend payment may drain the firm's cash resources so that future earnings are uncertain. But the same investors are persuaded to think positively about future earnings if the firm decides to increase dividends.
Even though both dividends and share buy-backs are ways of paying money back to shareholders, investors do not see share buy-backs as equivalent to dividends. Question 23 shows that, for the whole sample, investors do not want companies to substitute dividends for share buy-backs. The question how they would value a company decision to stop paying dividends and instead buying back shares, with a score of 1 representing "extremely negative" and a score of 7 representing "extremely positive" leads to a mean score of 3.81 with a t-value of -2.67. 24 Note that high-income investors have a bigger preference for share buy-backs to dividends compared to small investors, consistent with the finding from Questions 7 and 8 that small investors have a stronger preference for dividends. Question 24 shows that investors on average perceive a share buy-back to be a signal that the stock is undervalued. This confirms results by e.g. Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Vermaelen (1995, 2000) .
Individual investors definitely do not have a preference for dividends for tax reasons. Second, investors may not be aware of the fact that the dividend taxes can be reimbursed.
We checked whether the second reason is responsible for the dislike of dividends under the new tax system. In order to investigate this, we partition the whole sample into two sub-samples according to whether the responses to Question 25 are larger or smaller than 4. We find that the investors who dislike dividends for tax reasons (a score smaller than 4 on Question 25) are also those that do not submit an income tax form. Only 37.3% of those investors have asked for a tax reimbursement. In contrast, 61.1% of the investors who like dividends for tax reasons (a score higher than 4 on Question 25) have asked for such a reimbursement. The difference in means from the two sub-samples is significant at the 1% level. Table 3 includes the responses to the general dividend questions.
[Please insert Table 3 The responses to the behavioral finance questions are included in Table 4 .
[Please insert Table 4 here]
In Table 4 we test whether investors want dividends, because they prefer to consume from dividends rather than from capital gains. This notion was put forward first by Shefrin and Statman (1984) . In Question 16 we ask whether investors, for consumption purposes, would sell their stocks in a company that has always paid a dividend, if the management of that company would decide not to pay a dividend anymore. From
Question 16 we find that the mean score is 2.87, which means that investors tend to disagree with the given statement. Both the mean and the median are significantly different from 4. This holds both for the whole sample and for all the sub-samples. The answer to this question is unfavorable for the behavioral finance theory. However, it can also be the case that investors have different reasons for not wanting to sell the stocks in such companies. For example, they might find the transaction costs of selling such stocks too high.
Questions 14 and 15 are different from most of the other questions that are included in the questionnaire. In these questions we ask for the percentage of dividends and regular salary respectively that the investors use for consumption purposes. In order to facilitate the respondents we have put the percentages in five categories, ranging from 1 (= 0 to 20 percent) to 5 (= 80 to 100 percent). The mean score for the consumption from dividends is only 1.83. The mean score for the regular income is 3.13. The difference between these two categories (-1.44) is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
This indicates that investors consume more out of their regular salary than out of dividends.
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According to this theory of Shefrin and Statman (1984) , older investors have a larger preference for dividends than younger investors do, because they receive less regular 25 An anonymous referee questioned whether we would get the same result if we had asked for actual percentages, rather than scales. In our shorter follow-up questionnaire discussed earlier with respect to Questions 12 and 13, we asked the respondents for the actual percentages. The response was a mean of 22.4% consumption from dividends vs. 58.6% consumption from regular income. These means were significantly different at the 1% level. 24 salary. Brav et al. (2003) show that this is also the executives' opinion. The CFOs interviewed in their study believe that retail investors (at least the elderly) consume directly from their dividend receipts. In our sample, the mean consumption out of dividends is 2.00 for older investors and 1.69 for younger investors. This difference is significant at the 5% level. This is also consistent with the finding that these two categories of investors have a preference for dividends because of transaction costs.
However, we also find that older investors consume more out of their regular salary than younger investors. The mean score is 3.37 for the older investors and 2.95 for the younger investors. The difference between the age groups is significant at the 1% level.
However, the difference between Questions 14 and 15 is -1.44 for both younger and older investors. Hence we find that the notion amongst executives that elderly people consume from their dividend receipts is not confirmed. Brav et al. (2003) to re-invest most of the dividends. However, a caveat is in order here. In the U.S. tax system, dividends are paid to shareholders gross, i.e., with no personal income tax deducted. Shareholders then report the dividends on their tax return each year. The new tax code would therefore mean that investors still receive the same amount of dividends, but they will pay less in taxes at the end of the year. Still, our result offers direct evidence on the often-made statement that the marginal propensity to consume is significantly lower, on average, for most people who own shares. 
Results on Stock Dividends
The responses to the questions on stock dividends are included in Table 5 .
[Please insert Table 5 here]
The first question in Table 5 asks whether respondents consider stock dividends to be more like stock splits (response possibility 7) or like cash dividends (response possibility 1). The textbook answer would naturally be 7. The mean score for the whole sample is 4.16. The t-statistic is 2.04. The median score is 4. The median is significantly different from four at the 5% level. The number of scores higher than 4 is 39.8% versus only 27.7% that is lower than 4. It can be concluded that there is only a slight recognition that a stock dividend is more like a stock split than like a cash dividend. This either means that investors do not understand stock dividends or that there is a psychological 28 The conclusion that this dividend tax cut will only have second-order effects on the payout decision is also reached by Brav et al. (2003) . 26 explanation. The difference in means for the sub-samples of high income and universityeducated investors is not significantly different from zero. It is especially remarkable that investors with university education do not understand the nature of stock dividends.
However, the differences in scores between the different education and income groups are also not significant.
The second question on stock dividends (Question 29) shows that when only considering transaction costs, on average, investors prefer stock dividends compared to cash dividends. This result suggests that most investors reinvest their dividends, and further confirms the earlier conclusion we draw from Questions 8, 14 and 15. As mentioned in Section 3, stock dividends are a costless way of reinvesting dividends in the same stocks. However, as mentioned before, this assumes that investors consider stock dividends as real dividends, not as stock splits.
According to the answers to Question 30, investors are indifferent between cash and stock dividends for tax reasons. The average answer to Question 31 (4.56) shows that under the old tax system, investors had a preference for stock dividends over cash dividends for tax reasons. All sub-samples for this question show a score that is significantly higher than 4. This applies both to the means and to the medians. Finally, Question 32 shows that investors prefer a stock dividend to no dividend at all. Again, this applies for all sub-samples. This notion is stronger for respondents without university education than for respondents with university education.
Robustness Checks
One possible confusing effect on the tests of the theory is answers by respondents who do not want to receive dividends or who are indifferent. Gordon (1961 Gordon ( , 1962 and the behavioral explanation of Shefrin and Statman (1984) .
We mostly find support for the latter in case of stock dividends. Furthermore, we find that investors partly want dividends because of transaction costs. The results are inconsistent with the agency theories of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) . On the other hand a strong support is found for the signaling theories of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) .
A useful continuation of this line of research would be a survey of institutional investors: pension funds, investment funds and financial institutions on their own 29 These tables of results for this subsample are available from the authors on request. 28 account. They often face different tax rules than do individual investors, and their decision-making process is arguably better-informed.
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Appendix: The Questionnaire
This is the original English version, which we translated into Dutch for the panel.
Question 1
Do you currently own stocks of exchange-listed companies (other than investment funds)?
If the answer to this question is yes, please continue with Question 3. If the answer is no, please continue with Question 2.
Question 2
Did you own stocks of exchange-listed companies (other than investment funds) during the last three years?
Question 3
Do you currently own stocks of investment funds? This question only refers to direct investments in investment funds. Indirect investments, such as investments in the context of an investment mortgage or a life annuity are excluded.
If the answer to this question is yes, please continue with Question 5. If the answer is no, please continue with Question 4.
Question 4
Did you own stocks of investment funds during the last three years? This question only refers to direct investments in investment funds. Indirect investments, such as investments in the context of an investment mortgage or a life annuity are excluded.
Remark 1 for the respondents:
A. If you have answered yes to either Question 1 or 2 AND yes to either Question 3 or 4, then please continue with Question 5. B. If you have answered no to both Questions 1 and 2 AND yes to either Question 3 or 4, please continue with Question 6. C. If you did not fulfill conditions A and B, but you have answered yes to at least one of the questions from 1 to 4, then please continue with Question 7. D. If you have answered no to all of the first four questions, then this questionnaire is finished for you.
Remark 2 for the respondents: Questions 5 to 26 have to be answered for cash dividends only.
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Question 5
Please indicate on the following scale whether you hold some shares in investment funds in addition to holding shares in individual companies directly, because investment funds pay more reliable dividends (1 = completely disagree; 4 = neutral; 7 = completely agree; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 6
Please indicate on the following scale whether you hold shares in investment funds only and no shares in individual companies, because investment funds pay more reliable dividends (1 = completely disagree; 4 = neutral; 7 = completely agree; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 7
Please indicate on the following scale whether you like your stocks to pay dividends or not (1 = I do not want dividends; 4 = neutral; 7 = I want dividends; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 8
An individual investor can get money from shares either by receiving dividends or by selling some of the shares. Both ways require transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs that the bank or the broker charges you when paying a dividend or selling a share of common stock. Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 your opinion on the following statement. The transaction costs can be different between the sale of common stock and the receipt of a dividend. Because of this difference I have a preference for receiving dividends.
(1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 9
Companies that pay little or no dividends have more cash flow left to invest in new growth projects than companies that pay a lot of their income in dividends. Comparing high dividend yield companies with low dividend yield companies, do you believe that the high dividend companies are 1= less risky; 4= just as risky; 7= more risky; 8= no opinion/don't know.
Question 10
Please indicate your opinion on a scale from 1 to 7 on the following statement. Shares that pay relatively higher dividends are less risky.
(1 = strongly disagree; 4 = neutral; 7 = strongly agree; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 11
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The total return on a share of stock consists of the capital gains and the dividend yield. The dividend yield is the dividend expressed as a percentage of the stock price. In a down market, the dividend yield is a more substantial fraction of the total returns than in an up market. Is this a reason for you to invest more in dividend paying shares in a down market?
Question 12
Do you think that dividend-paying stocks offer more certainty about the companies' future earnings perspectives compared to stocks that do not pay dividends? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 13
Do you buy dividend-paying stocks because these companies generate real earnings and are less likely to "cook the books" (1 = no definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 14
How much of the total dividends that you receive do you use for current consumption purposes? Consumption purposes are expenditures for the purchase of goods such as cars, washing machines, food and such or for services such as holidays, going out to dinner and such. It is emphasized that the purchase of stocks, bonds and deposits do not classify as consumption purposes.
(__ 0-20% of the total amount; __ 20-40% of the total amount; __ 40-60% of the total amount; __ 60-80% of the total amount; __ 80-100% of the total amount; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 15
How much of the total income that you receive from regular salary (including pension) and social benefits do you use for consumption purposes? (__ 0-20% of the total amount; __ 20-40% of the total amount; __ 40-60% of the total amount; __ 60-80% of the total amount; __ 80-100% of the total amount; __ I receive no income from these sources; __ no opinion/don't know).
Question 16
Would you for consumption purposes sell part of your stocks in a company that has always paid a dividend, if the management of that company would decide not to pay a dividend anymore? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
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Question 17
In economic downturns, fewer good investment projects are available. Would you, for this reason, invest more in dividend paying stocks in down markets or in economic downturns? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 18
Do you wish to receive dividends because you believe the company will otherwise invest the money unprofitably? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 19
Would you like to receive cash dividends if a company would have to issue new shares of common stock in order to be able to afford the dividend payment? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 20
Would you like to receive cash dividends if a company would have to borrow money in order to be able to afford the dividend payment? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 21
Do you think that a dividend increase tells you something about the company's future performance? A dividend increase is an indication that the future performance:
(1 = will deteriorate strongly; 7 = will improve strongly; 8 = no opinion/don't know) Please choose 4 if a dividend increase does not tell you anything on the future performance of the company.
Question 22
Do you think that a dividend decrease tells you something about the company's future performance? A dividend decrease is an indication that the future performance:
(1 = will deteriorate strongly; 7 = will improve strongly; 8 = no opinion/don't know) Please choose 4 if a dividend decrease does not tell you anything on the future performance of the company.
Question 23
Suppose a company would stop paying dividends and instead use the money to buy back its own stocks on the market. How would you value such a decision? (1 = extremely negative; 4 = neutral; 7 = extremely positive; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
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Question 24
Do you think that a stock repurchase is good because it is a signal that the stock is undervalued? (1 = no, definitely not; 4 = neutral; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know).
Question 25
Please indicate on the following scale whether you like your stocks to pay dividends or not for tax reasons.
(1 = no, definitely not; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know). Please choose 4 if, for tax reasons, you are neutral towards dividends. Note: please answer this question in light of the current tax system (IB 2001).
Question 26
Please indicate on the following scale whether you used to like stocks to pay dividends or not for tax reasons under the old income tax regime (prevailing before January 1, 2001).
(1 = no, definitely not; 7 = yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know). Please choose 4 if, for tax reasons, you were neutral towards dividends before January 1, 2001.
Question 27
Did you submit an income tax form for the year 2001 in order to ask for a reimbursement of the dividend surtax ("dividendbelasting")? (1 = yes; 2 = no).
Remark 3 for the respondents: Questions 28 to 32 go into the comparison of cash and stock dividends. A cash dividend is a dividend in the form of cash. A stock dividend is a dividend in the form of shares of common stock.
Question 28
Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 whether you think that stock dividends are like cash dividends or whether they are like (small) stock splits. In a stock split a company decides to exchange each share of common stock in a fixed number of new shares. Stock dividends:
(1 = more look like cash dividends; 7 = more look like stock splits; 8 = no opinion/don't know). Please answer "4" if you think that they are neither like cash dividends nor like stock splits.
Question 29
Transaction costs are the costs that the bank or broker charges you when paying a dividend or selling shares. Can you please give your opinion on a scale from 1 to 7 on the following statement?
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Because of transaction costs I have a preference for stock dividends over cash dividends.
(1 = No, definitely not; 7 = Yes, definitely; 8 = no opinion/don't know). Please answer "4" if transaction costs do not play a role for you in the choice between stock and cash dividends.
Question 30
If you only consider income taxes, do you currently have a preference for stock or for cash dividends? Please answer this question in the context of the currently prevailing tax system that is operational since January 1, 2001
(1 = I prefer cash dividends; 7 = I prefer stock dividends; 8 = no opinion/don't know). Please answer "4" if income taxes do not play a role for you in the choice between stock and cash dividends.
Question 31
If you only consider income taxes, did you use to have a preference for stock or for cash dividends under the old tax regime (prevailing before January 1, 2001)? (1 = I used to prefer cash dividends; 4 = neutral; 7 = I used to prefer stock dividends; 8 = no opinion/don't know). Please answer "4" if income taxes did not play a role for you before January 1, 2001 in the choice between stock and cash dividends.
Question 32
Suppose a company does not have enough cash to pay a dividend. What is your preference in such a case: (1) to receive a stock dividend or (2) not to receive a dividend at all? (1 = preference not to receive a stock dividend; 4 = neutral; 7 = preference to receive a stock dividend; 8 = no opinion/don't know). In terms of EUR/month: 1. 0-500; 2. 500-1000; 3.1000-1500; 4. 1500-2000; 5. 2000-2500; 6. 2500-3000; 7. 3000-3500; 8. 3500-4000; 9. 4000-4500; 10. 4500-5000; 11. 5000-7500; 12. >7500; 13. Don't know; 14. Don't want to say 
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